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VOLUME XXXII APRIL i9z6 NUMBER 3
STARE DECISIS AND THE M4ODERN TREND
THOMAS P. HARwmAN*
A generation ago one of the world's eminent jurists said
of law that "all the available materials of that science are
contained in printed books."'  And greatly under the in-
fluence of the historical school of jurisprudence, then still
dominant, 2 the general judicial and juristic tendency was
one of rigid adherence to the legal rules, principles and
other general premise-elements 3 therein contained. The
law was stable, and stability was largely the end of law.
A "mechanical jurisprudence", 4 a sort of legal fundamen-
talism, was in vogue. A leader of the American bar,
writing in 1905, said:r
"If we scrutinise the actual process which we employ
today in ascertaining the law in any particular case, we
find that if the point in question be * * * private law;
* Professor of Law, West Virginia University.Langdell, Harvard Celebration Speech, 3 LAW QuAs. R v. 123, 124 (1887, delivered
in 1886).
2 See Beale, The Development of Jurisprudence During the Nineteenth Century,
1 Select Essays in Anglo-American Legal History, 558, 572; POUND, INTERPRETATIONS OF
LEOAL HISTORY 10 (1923). Cf. Sir Frederick Pollock, A Plea for Historical Interpre-
tation. 39 LAW QuAa. REv. 163, 164 (1923).
3 Rules and other premise-elements is the phrase which, for reasons hereinafter
appearing, is commonly used in this paper to describe the various elements of which
law is composed.' In the last generation these several premise-elements were generally
classed together as "rules". See. Gray, Some Definitions and Questions in Jurisprudence.
6 HAav. L. REV. 21, 24 (1892); HOLLAND, JURISPRUDENCE, c. 3 (11th ed. 1910). As to
the distinction between the various legal elements, see infra note 12 and the text in
the paragraph beginning with note 46.
4 See Pound, Mechanical Jurisprudence, 8 CoL. L. REv. 605 (1908).
JAmEs Co0LIDOR CARTER, LAW: ITS OnIoIN. GROWTH AND FUNCTION, 170, 171
(1907, written 1905).
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we turn to the body of precedents * * * *. Where an apt
precedent is found it is followed without further in.
quiry.'" 5%
This attitude was largely due to a widely accepted tenet
of the historical school" that the judges find, interpret, and
apply, but do not make law. Of course, there were other
causes. Even the progressive Mr. Justice Holmes, after
he had broken with the historical school, said in the last
year of the nineteenth century that it was not the province
of the judges "to renovate the law".7 However, under the
influence of the analytical and sociological schools of juris-
prudence, and under the pressure of the twentieth-century
demand for progress, this fictitious" historical and philos-
ophical tenet is today giving way to the view that, notwith-
standing the constitutional separation of powers, judicial
legislation not only is one of the existing realities in the
legal world, but is, within its appropriate sphere, a proper
function of the judicial process.9 The stability secured, or
supposed to be secured, by the mechanical stare decisis of
the last generation is, to a degree, giving way to the prog-
ress demanded by the present generation. And in this
process, as a leader of the American bar of today tells us,10
there is emerging year by year to fuller recognition "the
need of a philosophy that will mediate between the con-
flicting claims of stability and progress, and supply a prin-
ciple of growth."
"s Similarly, a generation ago the Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia
said: The court "is bound by precedents * * * * . It is only safe to knowi the
question has been settled, if settled at all, and then not depart from the rule: and If it
has not been settled, to settle it after a thorough examination of the principles. upon
which it must rest." Clarke & Co. v. Figgins, 27 Vt. Va. 668, 672 (1886). Of course.
there were sporadic departures from precedents in those days, but that these quotations
illustrate the general attitude a generation ago see further the history In West
Virginia of a precedent established in City of Wheeling v. Campbell, 12 W. Va, 86(1877). In Forsyth v. City of Wheeling, 19 W. Va. 318 (1882). the question was
again presented and the court simply said: "I consider the case of the City of
Wheeling v. Campbell, 12 W. Va. 36, as conclusive of this case." In Teass v. City of
St. Albans, 88 W. Va. 1, 17 S. E. 400 (1893), the question arose again and the court,
in answer to a contention that the question should be decided differently, said, without
considering The merits of the contention: "It is settled otherwise In this etate. See
City of Wheeling v. Campbell, 12 W. Va. 86." But at the beginning of the present
generation-the beginning of what Pound and other commentators call the stago of
the socialisation of the law, see, POUND, THE SPIRIT OF THE COMmoN LAW 195 (1921)
-the question arose in Ralston v. Town of Weston, 46 W, Va. 544, 38 S. E. 826 (1899),
and the court, perhaps actuated by the spirit of the modern movement, reversed the
precedent which it had previously "followed without further inquiry" because the law
was "settled" in West Virginia by the doctrine of stare deciai,.
The philosophical school had substantially the same tenet. See POUND, TH- SPIRIT
oF COMMON LAW, 165 (1921).
SHolmes, Law in Science and Science in Law. 12 HAav, L. REv.. 448, 460 (1809).
'See 2 AusTIN, JURXSPRUDENCB, 655 (4th ed. 1879); GRAY, THE NATURE AND
SOURCES OF THE LAW, 220 (1909).
9 See CAsPozo, THE NATURE Or THE JUDICIAL PROCESS, 10. 98 if, (1921), In
Southern Pacific Co. v. Jensen. 244 U. S. 205, 221 (1917), Mr. Justice Holmes says:
'I recognize without hesitation that Judges do and must legislate."
10 Caapozo, THE GROWT OF THE LAW. 1 (1924).
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The result is that within the last few years there has been
in many quarters a perceptible change of judicial and
juristic attitude toward the function of precedents--a ten-
dency in the direction of conscious judicial renovation,
judicial legislation or judicial restatement of the law.
This tendency, which is justifiable in part and unjusti-
fiable in part, is quite observable with respect to the
chief functions of the judicial process. 1 (1) With respect
to the function of finding the established or recognized
legal precept, i.e., rule, principle, or other premise-pre-
cept,12 to be applied, or, if there is none or none approved,
the function of establishing or recognizing one, there is in a
number of courts an increasing tendency to overlook or
otherwise overrule precedents or precepts which are out
of harmony with settled modern ideas of social welfare,
accepted social standards or the mores of the times.13 (2)
With respect to the function of interpreting the apt prece-
dents, the apt legal rules and other premise-precepts, there
is in many jurisdictions a tendency, in effect at least, to
construe the applicable statutes, constitutions and prece-
dents, and to "distinguish precedents" along less rigid lines,
along the lines of the mores of the times, so as to change
the law-a change which probably would not have resulted
from following the historical method of interpretation of
"I Of course, in the actual adjudication of cases the. functions of the Judicial pro-
cess are not always thus divided. Cf. POUND. AN INTRODUCTioN TO THS PHILOSOPHY Or
LAW, 100 (1922), where he says there are "three steps" involved in the adjudication
of a controversy according to law."
11 Legal "precepts" in the present common law are: (1) "rules, that is definite,
detailed provisions for definite, detailed states of fact"' (2) "principles," i.e.. "gen-
eral premises for judicial and juristic reasoning". (8) "standards." i.e., legally defined
measures of conduct. And, for present purposes, we may classify as legal "precepts".
(4) legal "conceptions". ie., "more or less exactly defined types, to which we refer
cases or by which we classify them, so that when a state of facts is classified we may
attribute thereto the legal consequences attaching to the type." See POUND, op. cit.
utpra note 11. at 115 ff. As to "conceptions" see further POUND, ov. cit. supra note 4.
11 No attempt is made in this article, particularly in this note and in notes 14.
1. 18 and 80. to cite all authorities in point or to be otherwise exhaustive in all
respects. Space does not permit. And that method of treating such a comprehensive
subject is beyond the scope of an article. A few of the authorities illustrating some
,f the aspects of (1) are: Rosen v. United States, 245 U. S. 467 (1918): Terrall V.
Purke Construction Co.. 257 U. S. 529 (1922) : Lee v. Chesapeake & Ohio Ry. Co.. 260
U. S. 653 (1923) ; Klein v. Maravelas, 219 N. Y. 888 (1916) : Spiegel's House
Furnishing Co. v. Industrial Commission. 288 M. 442. 123 N. E. 606 (1919) ;
commented upon by Wigmore in 14 Ila. L. REV. 825 (1919); Adams Express Co. _v.
Beckwith, 100 Oh. St. 148. 126 N. E. 800 (1919): Perry v. Haritos. 100 Conn. 416.
124 At. 44 (1924); Mitchell v. Standard Repair Co., 275 Pa. St. 328. 119 At. 410(1923) ; Thurston v. Fritz. 91 Kan. 468, 188 Pac. 625 (1914); Hines v. Commonwealth.
136 Va. 728. 117 S. E. 843 (1928) ; Ashland Finance Co. v. Dudley, 98 W. Va. 255, 127
S. E. 33 (1925). See also Dillon v. Heiler & Bros.. 99 N. T. L. 69. 122 AtI. 595 (1923).
overlooking. or at any rate not citing, the inconsistent case of State v. Snover, 63 N.
J. L. 382, 43 AtM 1059 (1899); Bunting v. Oregon, 248 U. S. 426 (1917), not citing
the Inconsistent case of Lochner v. New York, 198 U. S. -45 (1905). But see Alkinq
v. Children's Hosoltal. 261 U. S. 625 (1928). A legal periodical recently published
an editorial entitled: 'Does the Rule of Stare Decisis Any Longer Apply in the
Sunreme Court of the United States. 8 VA. L. REG. (N. S.) 148 (1922). But
Adkins v. Children's Hospital. supra, Is on its facts a too emphatic yes.
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a generation ago.14  (3) With respect to the function of
applying such apt precedents~,or precepts to the facts of
the case, where the logical or historical application after
the manner of the last generation would defeat the social
justice desired, there is in many localities a growing tend-
ency toward a less mechanical application,1 5 so as to do
justice in the individual case or in that class of cases. (4)
Frequently, as Mr. Justice Holmes has well said,10 "Gen-
eral propositions [rules, principles and other premise-
precepts] do not decide concrete cases. The decision will
depend on a judgment or intuition more subtle than any
articulate major premise." That is to say, in addition to
legal precepts (articulate major premises), and interpreta-
tions and applications thereof, the judicial process often
uses more or less inarticulate elements.17 And with respect
to this innominate and more or less inarticulate function of
the judicial process, there is perceptible in many courts a
somewhat sub-surface tendency, through the conscious or
subconscious use of these elements, to put increasing
emphasis upon social interests and in so doing to depart
from the individualistic method of approach and adjudica-
tion, and the individualistic law, of 'the last generation.18
As an eminent English jurist has just observed with refer-
ence to recent changes in the English law-an observation
1, The extent or actuality of such change in a given case Is often disputable. For
examples illustrating some of the aspects of (2), see Oppenheim v. Kridel, 286 N. Y.
156, 140 N. E. 227 (1923) ; United Mine Workers of America v. Coronado Coal Co..
259 U. S. 344 (.1922), discussed in Comments, 82 YALE L. J. 59 (1922) ; Carroll
v. United States, 267 U. S. 132 (1925) ; United States v. Railway Employees etc.
Federation of Labor, 283 Fed. 479 (1922), discussed in Comments, 82 YALE L. J.
166 (1922) ; Browzi v. Brown, 88 Conn. 42, 89 At]. 889 (1914); Roberts v. Rnberts.
185 N. C. 566, 118 S. E. 9 (1923), discussed in Comments, 63 YALE L. J.
315 (1924). Atkins v. Coal Co., '76 W. Va. 27, 84 S. E. 906 (1915). distinguishing State v.
Goodwill, 33 W. Va. 179, 10 S. E. 285 (1889) ; The Western Maid, 267 U. S. 419 -(1922).
distinguishing The Siren, 7 Wall. 152 (1868), though the result actually reached
in The Western Maid is perhaps not socially desirable. See Hough, Admiralty Juris-
diction-of Late Years. 37 HAn. L. REV. 529, 541 ff. (1924).
15 In practice these functions merge somewhat. The tendency to pay lip service
to precedents, to purport to apply a precedent but In fact not to apply It, Is best
considered under (3). For example, see United States v. Grimaud. 220 U. S. 506 (1911).
in fact permitting delegation of legislative power. See also Pound, Law In Books
and Law in Action, 44 Arm. L. Rgv..12 (1910) ; and Hynes v. New York Central R. R.
Co., 231 N. Y. 229. 131 N. E. 898 (1921) ; discussed in this article. As to (3), and also
(1) and (2). in England, see W. Jethro Brown, Administration of Justice in England,
1906 V. 1923, 33 YALE L. J. 838 (1924).
16 Lochner a. New York, supra note 13, at 76.
" Cf. CARnozo, op. cit. supra note 9, at 12.
The due-process cases illustrate this tendency. The courts cannot, or at any
rate' do not. define due process. Davidson a. New Orleans, 96 U. S. 97. 104 (1877).
Therefore, in such cases we have no articulate precepts that are sufficient premises for
the adjudication of such cases. Cf. Kales, "Due Process", The Inarticulate Major
Premise and the Adamson Act, 26 YALE L. J. 519 (1917). See Muller v. Oregon.
208 U. S. 412 (1908) which, in that type of cases at any rate, Is the turning point
in this respect. Professor Frankfurter in his valuable article on Hours of Labor and
Realism in Constitutional Law, 29 HARP. L. REV. 353 (1916), illustrates this tendency
with citation of authorities.
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which is equally true in American law,19 there have been
in the present generation a 4'waning in the importance of
precedent," and "a more evident desire and / or ingenuity
in distinguishing a precedent from the complexus of facts
before the Court if the application of precedent might lead
to inconvenient consequence * * * * * *. In my opinion,
there has been a quite observable tendency, during the last
two decades, for the British Bench to interpret and apply
justice with reference to 'the merits of the case.' "20 In
short, while there were sporadic examples of this sort of
thing in the past generation, within the last few years
there has developed, on the lines and between the lines, a
perceptible tendency in Anglo-American jurisdictions to
divorce the old mechanical jurisprudence and to espouse a
new jurisprudence-a tendency, with respect to the chief
functions of the judicial process, to depart from precedents,
i.e., previously decided rules and other premise-elements,
and interpretations and applications thereof, where upon a
balancing of all the interests involved, including the social
interest in the stability secured by adherence to precedent
and the social interest in progress secured by departure
from precedent, the interests to be secured by departure
from precedent outweigh the interests to be secured by
adherence to precedent.
The general aspect of this modern tendency is admirably
illustrated in a comparatively recent Connecticut case in
which Mr. Justice (now Chief Justice) Wheeler took the
right attitude :21
"That court best serves the law which recognizes that
the rules of law which grew up in a remote generation
may, in the fulness of experience, be found to serve an-
other generation badly, and which discards the old rule
when it finds that another rule of law represents what
should be according to the established and settled judg-
ment of society, and no considerable property rights have
become vested in reliance upon the old rule. It is thus
great writers upon the common law have discovered the
source and method of its growth, and in its growth have
found its health and life. It is not and it should not be
1W. Jethro Brown, op. cit. supra note 15, at 88-839.
so And the learned jurist added, "without an adequate consideration of the
effects of decision upon an already chaotic body of law."
1 Dwy v. Connecticut, 89 Conn. 74. 99, 92 Atl. 883. 891 (1915). This was a con-
curring opinion. but see further illustrating this tendency the later majority opinion
by the same judge in Perry v. Haritos, upra note 13.
6
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stationary. Change of this character should not be left
to the legislature." o
This tendency toward conscious judicial renovation or
restatement of the law is strikingly illustrated by a recent
progressive opinion of the New York Court of Appeals. In
that decision, which expressly departs from the common
law in order to secure the social interest in progress, the
court declared:22
"Courts exist for the purpose of ameliorating the
harshness of ancient laws [precedents] inconsistent with
modern progress when it can be done without interfer-
ing with vested rights * * * . The common law is not a
compendium of mechanical rules written in fixed and
indelible characters, but a living organism which grows
and moves in response to the larger and fuller develop-
ment of the nation."
Not long since the United States Supreme Court said :23
"The rule of stare decisis * * * * is not inflexible.
Whether it shall be followed or departed from is a ques-
tion entirely within the discreffon of the court, which is
again called upon to consider a question once decided."
Still more recently the Supreme Court, in departing from
precedent characterized the disapproved precedent as "the
dead hand of the common-law rule of" a past generation. 24
And last year the Supreme Couit of Appeals of West
Virginia, in reversing a prior decision, said of the precedent
that it had "become a judicial pariah in our reports. ' 2 4
A more extreme illustration of this tendency is found in a
recent unanimous opinion of the Supreme Court of Ohio
in which the following rather ultra-modernist attitude is
taken :2
"Precedenits are valuable for information, admonition,
and as milestones in the nation's progress. But they do
not necessarily imply the last word of wisdom. They
are not always to be adopted. They are quite frequently
to be avoided. They are worth exactly what they weigh
in right and reason when applied to the particular cir-
cumstances of each particular, case."
2 Oppenheim v. Kridel, supra note 14, at 164-165.
23 Hertz v. Woodman, 218 U. S. 205, 212 (1910).
21 Rosen v. United States, supra note 18 at 471.
- Ashland Finance Co. v. .Dudley, 98 W. Va. 255, 127 S. E. 33 (1925).
" Kintz v. Harriger 99 Oh. St. 240, 245, 124 N. E. 168 (1919).
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Even the conservative English courts have recently
shown a tendency to sacrifice precedent to settled modern
ideas of social justice. Thus, in a comparatively recent
House of Lords case which departed from the common law,
a dissenting judge, reflecting the tendency of the last gen-
eration, said :26
"We have to deal not with a rule of public policy
which might fluctuate with the opinions of the age, but
with a definite rule of law * * * . The opinion of the age
may influence the application of this rule but cannot
affect the rule itself."
But what this dissenting judge says "cannot" be done is in
effect what all the other judges held could be done and
permitted to be done. And one of England's most eminent
jurists, Sir Frederick Pollock, has said of this dissenting
opinion that it has no worse fault than that of being "out
of date".2 According to this tendency, then, if "the opinion
of the age" with respect to a "rule" of the common law is
sufficiently settled and preponderant, it not only can but
often does "affect the rule itself", i.e., the rule, principle,
standard or other general premise-element, namely, the law.
In this connection Professor Corbin has well said :28
"If the open acknowledgment of the fact that there
are many sources of law other than statute and precedent
is heresy in the legal profession, so much the worse for
the legal profession. Heresy or not, it is the fact."
As a New York court has recently expressed it :29
"Precedent is not our only guide in deciding these dis-
putes, for many are worn out by time and made useless
by the more enlightened and humane conception of socialjustice. That progressive sentiment of advanced
civilization, which has compelled legislative action to
correct and improve conditions which a proper regard
for humanity would no longer tolerate, cannot be
ignored by the courts. Our decisions should be in har-
mony with that modern conception and not in defiance of
it."'
And there are numerous other recent, or comparatively
- Bowman v. Secular Society, A. C. 406, 432 (1917), per Lord Finlay, L. C.
Italics ours.
- 33 LAw QUAa. REv. 300, 802 (1917).
Corbin, The Law and the Judges, 3 YALE REv. (N. S.) 234, 245 (1914).
Schlesinger v. Quinto, 192 N. Y. S. 564, 569 (1922).
8
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recent, judicial decisions, dicta and juristic pronouncements
to much the same effect.80 It must be admitted, then,
whether or not we like it, that there is a marked tendency
in the present generation to relax the theoretically funda-
mental doctrine of stare decisis, to re-examine supposedly
settled rules, principles and other premise-elements, and in
some jurisdictions to treat precedents somewhat after the
manner of the earlier common law and after the manner
of the civil law,"' if not merely as evidence of the law, at
least as not binding, rather than after the general manner
of the common law of the last generation as law in and of
themselves.3 2  Hence, another prediction of our great legal
prophet is now being fulfilled, for nearly a generation ago
Mr. Justice Holmes said:83
"We are only at the beginning of a philosophical
reaction, and of a reconsideration of the worth of doc-
trines which for the most part still are taken for granted
without any deliberate, conscious, and systematic ques-
tioning of their grounds * * * . It is revolting to have no
better reason for a rule of law than that so it was laid
down in the time of Henry IV. It is still more revolting
if the grounds upon which it was laid down have vanished
long since, and the rule simply persists from blind imita-
tion of the past."
Thus, there is a judicial and juristic tendency in the
present generation to do what the great Biblical jurist
extrajuristically advised, viz., to "prove all things; hold
fast that which is good [and that only]."34 A philosophy
of practical rationalism 5 and of social utilitarianism is
coming in vogue.
so For examples, in addition to the authorities cited supra In notes 13, 14 and 15,
see Cuthbert W. Pound, Some Recent Phases of the Evolution of Case Law, 81 YALE
L. J. 361 (1922) ; and Mosehzisker, Stare Decsis in Courts of Last Resort. 87 HARY. L.
REV. 409 (1924). See Brannon. J., in Weston v. Ralston, 48 W. Va. 170. 86 S. E.
446 (1900): "No legal principle is ever settled until it is settled right." Compare
Falconer v. Simmons, 51 W. Va. 172, 179, 41 S. E. 193 (1902).
"1 See Borchard, Some Lessons From the Civil Law, 64 UNIv. or PA. L. Rav.
570, 571; Gray, Judicial Precedents,-A Short Study in Comparative Jurisprudence, 9
HARe. L. REV. 27, 40 (1895).
42 See, e.g., Harris v. Jex, 65 N. Y. 421 424 (1874). But see Paul v. Davis, 100
Ind. 422, 426 (1885); and Whitney, The Doctrine of Stare Decilsi, 8 MIcr. L. Rr-V.
89, 91 (1904).
Holmes, The Path bf the Law, 10 HARV. L. REV. 457, 468-469 (1897).
PAUL. THE BIBLE, 1 THESSALONIANS, C. 5.
' Not a rationalism based on "pure reason" but one based also on "practical
reason", a rationalism that insists upon reasons which will justify law or legal
doctrine as a means for securing a maximum of human wants with a minimum
sacrifice of other wants. The philosophy of the sociological school is a "fusion" of
philosophies. See. Charmont, 7 MODERN LEGAL PHILOSOPEEN SERIES, 65-66, 115.116 (1916).
Ci. Charmont, op. cit. supra at 145: "There is an element of Pragmatism in this con.
ception, but it is a mitigated Pragmatism, subjected to the control of reason." Cf.
WIGoORE AND- KOCOUREK, Editorial Preface, RATIONAL BASIS or LEGAL INSTITUTION3
XX (1923).
9
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Lest it be thought that the position taken in this article
overemphasizes some tendencies, the writer wishes to insert
the caution that, of course, those courts which have shown
these tendencies in certain cases cannot always be relied
upon to show uniform tendencies even in the same class
of cases. To err is still human. Thus, each of the leaders
in the modern trend, the United States Supreme Court and
the New York Court of Appeals, has handed down a recent
noteworthy decision"8 which runs rather counter to the
prophecies of what these courts would do in this respect.
But just as a few sporadic departures from stare decisis
do not create a tendency, so a few sporadic deviations from
the modern trend do not destroy the tendency.
An extensive excursus upon the nature of law is, of
course, beyond the scope of this paper. Nevertheless, as
the proper function of a precedent in modern Anglo-
American law depends largely on what is considered as
constituting law,, it is necessary in such a discussion to have
in mind some definite conception of what is meant by law.
What, then, is law, i.e., for present purposes, the common
law? In the first place, modern law, according to leading
jurists, consists of four elements: viz., rules, principles,
standards and conceptions.3 7 These four elements are for
immediate purposes, called precepts or precept-elements.
But how do we determine what precepts are law? Where
there are apt precedents, is the common law, as is so often
asserted, only such precepts as are to be found in or de-
duced from the apt precedents? Is it true, as Langdell
said of law in the last generation, "that all the available
materials of that science are contained in printed books?88
If the common law is to be found solely in or deduced
solely from the apt precedents, a court, if it decided cases
according to law, could not overrule a precedent which is
found to be out of harmony with the preponderant settled
opinion or accepted standards of society, the mores of the
times. But all common-law courts, except perhaps one or
U The United States Supreme Court In Adklns v. Children's Hospital, supra note
18, Taft, C. J., Holmes and Sanford. JJ., dissenting, Brandeis, J., taking no part in
the decision; the New York Court of Appeals in Crowley v. Lewis, 239 N. Y. 264, 146
N. E. 874 (1925), as to which see Comments, 34 YALm L. J. 782 (1925).
; Described supe note 12.
Langdell, op. eit. apra note 1.
9 The House of Lords considers itself bound by its own decisions. See London
Street Tramways Co. v. London County Council. A. C. 875 879 (1898). But even the
House of Lords has occasionally "effected a complete change of front * * * without
overruling" its own decisions. See Sir Frederick Pollock. op. cit. 8upra note 2. at 163.
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two, 9 reverse themselves, and many of them without much
hesitation and with increasing frequency. Therefore, the
common law is, in part at least, something more than those
precepts which are found in or deduced from precedents.
What, then, is that something which constitutes the common
law? Mr. Justice Holmes gives us the key to the correct
answer. He says :40
"The prophecies of what the courts [or court-like trib-
unals41] will do in fact, and nothing more pretentious,
are what I mean by the law."
That is to say, the law today is what the courts or similar
tribunals would decide today, is the legal rules and other
general premise-elements which such tribunals would rec-
ognize or establish today, and is not solely what the prece-
dents say. One modern writer has said:
"The 'law' governing a particular state of facts which
happens today is the rule which will tomorrow be applied
to the state of facts by the executive, administrative orjudicial officers engaged in administering justice. The
'law' is not the decisions made * * * before the state of
facts happened. Existing decisions * * * * are simply
some of the stimuli, among many others, which are avail-
able to secure from the executive, administrative or judi-
cial officer, the response which will be the rule applying
to the state of facts."42
The Supreme Court of California has said :43
"A lawyer who would have advised a client to rely
upon the Berson Case44 [a case in that jurisdiction which
was considered wrong] * * * would show his incapacity."
As the court correctly stated in a recent case in which it
was essential to decide what the then existing law was in
a given jurisdiction :45
"The question to be determined * * * is not wholly
what has been held [in that jurisdiction] * * but what
would be held * * * [today] in that jurisdiction * * * It
"Holmes, op2. cit. supra note 83, at 461.
42 Modern administrative tribunals which decide cases according to legal rules,
.rinciples or other general premise-elements must, in this respect, be classed with
courts.
I Statement of an unnamed member of the faculty in Columbia Law School.
quoted in Wood, Measurement of Law School Work, 24 COL. L. REV. 224, 282 (1924).
Alferitz . Borgwardt, 126 Cal. 201, 208, 68 Pac. 460 (1899).
4 Berson v. Nunan, 63 Cal. 550 (1883).
" Hansen v. Grand Trunk Ry. Co., 78 N. H. 518, 523, 102 At]. 626 (1917).
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might be that the precedent [in that jurisdiction] was
palpably erroneous, and that there was every proba-
bility that it would be overruled, if the present case were
taken there for final decision."
It is commonly said or assumed that law in the modern
jurisdiction consists exclusively of articulate precepts.
Thus, it has been said that "all law consists of norms, and
whatever cannot be reduced to a norm does not in reality
belong to the law."46 But is there another element which,
though not such a precept, is, like such precepts, essentially
a "major-premise" element which performs the same sort
of function as such precepts with respect to "the prophecies
of what the courts will do in fact?" For sometimes, to
quote Holmez again, 47 "General propositions [articulate
precepts] do not decide concrete cases. The decision will
depend on a judgment or intuition more subtle than any
articulate major premise." That is to say, we cannot
always articulate a major-premise precept that is a suffi-
cient premise for deciding a case. At any rate in due-
process cases, the premises, in general, are not and appar-
ently cannot be fully enunciated in the form of such
articulate premise-precepts. 4 But in such cases, the
trained, though inarticulate, "judgment or intuition" of
the judges (together with such articulate precepts as are
more or less applicable) may lead to as just and uniform
results as where the judges can adjudicate according to
articulate, but sometimes conflicting, rules and other
premise-elements. From this demonstrable and predict-
able general method of deciding cases, we can, to a reason-
able degree of probability, make "phophecies of what the
courts will do in fact", though perhaps not always to the
same degree as where the courts can adjudicate according
to articulate legal precepts. Therefore, as a practical
matter, and "law is [or should be] a practical matter",49
does the law in some cases consist also of the more or less
inarticulate elements involved in the predictable general
method or methods of adjudicating according to a trained
"s See 2 MODERN LEGAL PHILOSOPHY SERIES 386 (1912).
a Lochner v. New York, supra note 13, at 76.
ISee Davidson v. New Orleans, sup-a note 18; Hough, Due Process of Law
-Today, 32 EARv. L. REV. 218 (1919). Cf. Kales, "Due Process", The Inarticulate
Major Premise and the Adamson Act, 26 YALE L. J. 619 (1917).
"0 Pound, Juristic Science and Law, 31 HARv. L. REv. 1047, 1058.
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judgment or intuition?5O Or are these elements less than
law? Of course, much of our judicial administration of jus-
tice is not, and rightly is not, "an administration of justice
by law", but is an "administration of justice by the more or
less trained intuition of experienced magistrates". That is to
say, sometimes there is, on the particular point, no major-
premise precept to guide the magistrates; the decision is
left to their discretion"; it is an administration of "justice
without law."50 " But is a court's major premise less than
law simply because the court leaves the major premise
inarticulate or largely inarticulate? Perhaps it should be
added parenthetically that still other elements commonly
play an important part in "the prophecies of what the
courts will do in fact", viz., the purely personal elements
(such as the personal predilections of the judges of the
time being) that give direction to the decisions of the par-
ticular judges. But these factors are not legal elements,
for they are not general elements, and law involves, inter
ctia, the idea of generality. To this extent, Holmes' defi-
nition of law involves a non-legal element.
A definition of law which would be accurate for all
times and places is perhaps impossible.51 For present pur-
poses, however, law in the modern jurisdiction may be
summarily defined as the totality of rules, principles, stand-
ards and / or other general premise-elements5 2 which are,
or would be, sanctioned today by the politically organized
community (acting through its approved method of pro-
cedure) for the purpose of securing such interests, i.e.,
wants, claims or desires, as such community, through its
method of expression, thinks should be secured by authori-
tative action. 53 For the sake of convenience, however, law
is hereinafter frequently referred to simply as "rules and
other premise-elements."
With this conception of law in mind let us briefly con-
No Compare Dean Pound's pronouncement that "the common law 0 0 Is essentially
a mode of judicial and juristic thinking, a mode of treating legal problems rather
than a fixed body of definite rules." POUND, THE SPIRIT OF THE COMMON LAW, 1 (1921).
90- See POUND, op. Cit. suPra note 11, at III ff.
51 See Swan, Reconstruction and the Legal Profession, 28 YALE L. J. '84, 789
(1919) : "The law is a * * * 0 S changing thing which mast keep page with
the changing Ideals and mores of the community."
2 Conceivably the law In a given jurisdiction may not Include all of the abovo.
mentioned general premise-elements. Therefore, the "and / or" form of definition is
used.
u Compare Young, The Law as an Expression of Community Ideals and the
Lawmaking Functions of Courts, 27 YALs L. J. 1 (1917); and POUND, OUTINEs or
LECTuREs ON JuRmPRuDENCz 68 (3rd ed. 1920).
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sider some aspects of the modern trend. In the first place,
it is beginning to be recognized that, broadly speaking, the
whole field of law is undergoing a fundamental change
which Dean Pound with other commentators has aptly
characterized as the socialization of the law.5 That is to
say, although during the last generation the law was largely
individualistic, generally considering the contestants in a
case as isolated individuals with little or no regard for the
interests of society, the tendency in the present generation
is to consider that the community, the social group, rather
than the individual, is the important element in modern civ-
ilization and that, therefore, the contestants in a case should
be considered also as an inseparable part of society. This
thought or mode of thinking has attained considerable
vogue on the continent.55  Mr. Justice Holmes enunciated
this idea in America, in somewhat embryonic form, as early
as 1881.58 And under his able leadership the modern
tendency is, in a measure at least, to socialize the law, i.e.,
to emphasize the interests of society-to insist upon secur-
ing the wants of the community, the social interests, rather
than the interests of the individuals, when these social and
individual interests conflict so that it is necessary to sacri-
fice one or more of these interests, to some extent at least,
in order to satisfy the other interest or interests, but, of
course, to sacrifice the individual interests only when
the social interests outweigh the individual interests. As
the United States Supreme Court rather recently said :57
"There must be progress, and if in its march private
interests are in the way they must yield to the good [i.e.,
the interests] of the community."
Under this method of reasoning it is conceived that the
subject-matter of law is interests; that law is, as Jhering
says, "a means to an end" 8-a means to secure interests;
and that, since all the interests involved in a controversy
cannot be secured, inasmuch as they conflict, the end of
law today is to secure as many interests as possible and
sacrifice as few interests as possible, and, in balancing the
V4 See POUND, op. cit. supra note 50, at 195.
rz See CHARMONT, 7 MODERN LEGAL PHILOSOPHY SERIES 65 (1916) ; BEROLZHEIMER,
2 MODERN LEGAL PHILOSOPHY SERIES 351 ff. (1912).
" HOLMES, THE COMMON LAW, 43, 44, 48 (1881).
15 Hadacheck v. Sebastian, 239 U. S. 894, 410 (1915).
"' JHERINO, 5 MODERN LEGAL PHILOSOPHY SERIES, (1914), transl. of her "Der
Zwek fin Recht" (1877).
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interests to determine which interests should be secured
and which sacrificed, to secure the more important interests
and sacrifice the less important interests.59 As an eminent
French jurist has expressed it:O
"This principle, which one may call that of the equili-
brium of the interests concerned, must be the guide of
the courts * .* * . The object held in view by this prin-
ciple is nothing but that of giving the greatest possible
satisfaction to the wishes of the various parties consistent
with the realization of the social purposes of mankind.
The general method of accomplishing this purpose is to
recognize all the conflicting interests concerned, to esti-
mate their respective force, to weigh, them, as it were,
in the scales of justice so as to give the preponderance to
the most important of them tested by some social stand-
ard, and finally to bring about that equilibrium between
them which is so greatly to be desired."
Of course, the difficult problem under this- mode of
thinking is how to decide which of the conflicting interests
outweigh the others. But, like justice, interests cannot be
equitably weighed (as they have been weighed) on a bal-
ance with Procrustean bowls mechanically filled with facts.
Here, as elsewhere in the law, the scales of justice must
often be not only "general propositions" but also a more
or less trained "judgment or intuition." As Mr. Justice
Holmes has well said :61
"In the law we only occasionally can reach an abso-
lutely final and quantitative determination, because the
worth of the competing social ends which respectively
solicit a judgment for the plaintiff or the defendant
cannot be reduced to number and accurately fixed. The
worth, that is, the intensity of the competing desires,
varies with the varying ideals of the time, and, if the
desires were constant, we could not get beyond a relative
decision that one was greater and one was less. But it
is of the essence of improvement that we should be as
accurate as we can."
Dean Pound, pursuing this method of reasoning in an
article published in 1914, described seven noteworthy
changes in the law in the present generation, which, he
H See POUND. INTRODUCTION TO THE PHILOSOPHY OF LAw. 89.99 (1922) ; GmELIN, 9
MODERN LEGAL PHILOSOPHY SERIES. 10-1381 (1917), transl. of his Quousque (1910).
CO Francois G~ny, 'WMthode VY interpretation et sources en 1drolt priv6 poaitif".
(1899), transl. 9 MODERN LEGAL PHILOSOPHY SERIES 1, at 85 (1Q17).
ft HOLmEs, 'COLLECTED LEGAL PAPERS, 281 (1920),
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says, illustrate the twentieth-century legal development
known as the socialization of the law.6 2 In his valuable
book on the Spirit of the Common Law, published in 1921,
he catalogued eight such changes. 63 And now that there
are other wide-spread changes tending mainly in the same
general direction, it would seem that those eight changes
and these other socializing changes have developed into
what we may call a tendency in the present generation to
sacrifice precedent to social justice,-a tendency, con-
sciously or subconsciously, to emphasize social interests and
in so doing to sacrifice precedents where the interests to be
secured by departure from precedent outweigh the interests
to be secured by adherence to precedent,-a tendency, in
effect, toward the legal recognition, at least to a far greater
extent than in the past generation, of not only the social in-
terests catalogued in this connection by Dean Pound, but
also, among others: (1) the social interest in progress, par-
ticularly, (a) the social interest in legal progress, e.g., the
social interest in a rationalization and practicalization of the
law which will make law a more workable means for satis-
fying the wants of society, (b) the social interest in what we
may call environmental progress, the social interest in the
environmental betterment and beautification of thecommun-
ity; (2) the allied social interest in satisfying the mores of
the times--the social interest in satisfying the accepted
standards and the preponderant settled opinion or moral
sense of society as to what is justice; (3) the closely con-
nected social interest in securing respect for and obedience
to law, for law that is not reasonably up to date with
modern conceptions and standards of justice on the mores
of the day is conducive to disrespect for and disobedience
to such law.6
In many quarters this tendency directly or indirectly to
sacrifice precedent to justice is observable, broadly speak-
ing, in most branches of the law, even, to some extent, in
2 Pound, The End of Law as Developed in Legal Rules and Doctrines, 27 HARv. L.
Rrv. 195, 226 (1914). These seven changes are outlined thus: (1) Limitations on
the use of property and the so-called anti-social exercise of rights, (2) limitations on
freedom of contract, (8) limitations on the jus disponendi, (4) limitations on the
power of the creditor or injured party to exact satisfaction, (5) imposition of liability
without fault, particularly in the form of responsibility for agencies employed, (6)
change of res communes and res auilius into res publicce, and (7) insistence upon the
Interest of society in dependent members of the household."
a At 185-189, outlining the additional change thus: "An increasing tendency to
hold that public funds should respond for injuries to individuals by public agencies."
"Compare, Pound, A Theory of Social Interests, 15 PUBLICATIONS OF THs Am-
2LIOAN SOCIOLOGICAL SOCITY 16 (1920).
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real property law, though the tendency in that branch of
the law, because of the important social interest in stability
and in the security of property, is much less marked than
in those branches of the law, e.g., the law of evidence, the
law of public utilities, administrative law or constitutional
law, where the social interest in progress frequently out-
weighs the social interest in stability. Therefore, this tend-
ency to subordinate precedent to justice supplies a means
to "mediate between the conflicting claims of stability and
progress", 65 a means "to make effort more effective in
achieving the purposes of law", 6 and thereby to satisfy two
of the chief objectives of the modern jurists.
In recently referring to the "tendency to subordinate
precedent to justice", Judge Cardozo says:E17
"How to reconcile that tendency, which is a growing
and in the main a wholesome one, with the need of
uniformity and certainty, is one of the great problems
confronting the lawyers and judges of our day. We
shall have to feel our way here as elsewhere in the law.
Somewhere between worship of the past and exaltation
of the present, the path of safety will be found."
But where is that "somewhere"? And what philosophy
will guide us in "feeling our way" to and along "the path
of safety"? It is submitted, and Cardozo has practically
admitted,68 that the path-of-safety guide is to be found in
a simple fundamental of sociological jurisprudence. Ex-
pressed in the terminology of the sociological jurists, the
answer may be stated as follows:
Whether or not a court or court-like tribunal should in
a particular case adhere to or depart from a precedent,
established or recognized by such tribunal or by any tribu-
nal other than one of higher rank in or for that jurisdiction,
depends on whether departure from such precedent or ad-
herence to such precedent will secure a maximum of inter-
ests with a minimum sacrifice of other interests--whether,
upon a balancing of all the interests involved, including the
social interest in the certainty and stability secured by
adherence to precedent, departure from precedent or ad-
herence to precedent will secure the more important inter-
' See CARDOZO, OP. cit. supra note 10, at 1.
60 See PouND, op. cit. supra note 53, at 87.
67 CARDozo, op. cit. supra note 9, at 160.
e Ibid. at 112-118.
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ests and sacrifice the less important interests. Whether a
departure will secure such maximum satisfaction must be
determined by considering, inter alia, whether the pro-
posed rule or other premise-element will work better in
practice than did the rule or other premise-element pre-
viously sanctioned, or whether the proposed interpretation
or application of an admittedly sound rule or other premise-
element will work better in practice than did the interpre-
tation or application approved by the previous decision.
Of course, a subordinate court or subordinate court-like
tribunal should not depart from an apt precedent laid down
by a higher tribunal in or for that particular jurisdiction,
except perhaps in an undefined type of cases, one example
of which is where the majority of the present members of
such higher tribunal have in their recent and latest expres-
sions unequivocally shown by obiter dicta that they will
overrule that precedent if the opportunity ever presents
itself. Not only the ordinary reasons underlying stare
decisis but other reasons require this more rigid rule for
subordinate tribunals. A contrary rule for such tribunals
would not be conducive to legal chaos and official insubor-
dination. But these additional reasons for the rule do not
apply in this type of cases. Therefore, in such cases, may
we apply a sort of cessante ratione cessat et ipsa lex? In
the absence of the reasons for this more rigid rule and in
the absence of a contrary statutory or constitutional require-
ment, should there be an exception in this undefined type
of cases, if we are convinced that, beyond a reasonable
doubt, such exception will secure a maximum of interests
with a minimum sacrifice of other interests? Indeed, if
"law" is as Mr. Justice Holmes defines it, "the prophecies of
what the courts will do in fact", then may we generalize
that, where upon a balance of probabilities, we can proph-
esy that, beyond a reasonable doubt, such higher tribunal
would, in a given case, not adhere to such precedent,-
where, as it were, there is no room for two reasonable
opinions upon the questions whether and to what extent
such higher tribunal would depart from such precedent if
the case in hand were carried there for adjudication, the
only reasonable opinion being that there would be a depar-
ture at least to such and such an extent, then, to that
extent, it would be justifiable and socially desirable for
18
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such subordinate tribunal (with due deference to such
higher tribunal) to depart from such precedent by the same
reasoning as that provided for higher tribunals? If Holmes'
definition of law is correct, would not such departure by
the subordinate tribunal be a decision of the case according
to law, i.e., according to "the prophecies of what the courts
[or court-like tribunals] will do in fact"? If the lower
tribunal did not thus depart from such precedent, there
might be a gross miscarriage of justice, for the party against
whom such erroneous precedent would operate might, for
financial or other reasons, not carry the case to such higher
tribunal. Furthermore, would not adherence to such a
palpably unsound precedent secure the socially undesirable
result of promoting popular disrespect for and disobedience
to such "law"? But be such exception, if any, as it may,
whenever it is proper to depart from a previous decision,
the guide to determine the question and course of departure
should be the securing of a maximum of interests with a
minimum sacrifice of other interests. As the Supreme
Court of Illinois has recently said (per Mr. Justice Carter) :60
"Where the error of a previous decision is recognized,
the question whether the rule of stare decisis shall be
followed becomes a simple choice between relative evils."
What, then, in general are the interests to be secured or
sacrificed by adherence to or departure from erroneous
precedent? What are the "relative evils" and advantages
between which we are to choose? Sufficiently for present
purposes, there is on the one hand the social interest in
"stability", the social interest in uniformity of decisions and
certainty in the law-interests which would sometimes be
better secured by rigid adherence to precedent. But today
precedents are frequently so conflicting, or so uncertain or
so voluminous that they or their effect are practically un-
ascertainable and, in practice, frequently are unascertained.
And, therefore, the stability, certainty and uniformity
secured by mechanically attempting to adhere to conflict-
ing, uncertain or practically unascertainable precedents
are often illusions. Dean Pound has pointed out that, in
the civil-law system where precedents are not considered
n rraU v. Burckhartt, 299 Ill. 19, 41, 132 N. E. 280 (1921).
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binding, the certainty in the law is probably as great as it
is in the common-law system.70
In this connection Dean Wigmore has made the following
interesting observations: 71
"Certainty is the third supposed virtue of stare decisis.
The theoretical value of certainty, and the best feasible
method of securing it, are interesting questions. But it
is difficult to reflect on this part of the question without
emphasizing the pragmatic element. For the inquiry
presses, how far indeed has certainty been secured by
our practice? Would a less frequent invocation of stare
decisis have given the community less certainty in jus-
tice? Is the degree of the present obvious lack of cer-
tainty due to other causes, or to the inherent impotency
of stare decisis for that purpose? In countries like
France, which started a century ago with the negation of
that principle, but gradually came to recognize it to a
degree, has there been adequate certainty?"
One reason, why, in present-day practice, the doctrine of
stare decisis is not more conducive to certainty and uni-
formity, or stability, is that today, because of the over-
crowded court calendars, it is practically impossible for the
judges to investigate all apt precedents, even if all apt
precedents were available. And, therefore, the judges,
as they sometimes admit,7 2 in practice commonly investigate
only a part of the apt precedents, thus often deciding contra
to precedent without realizing it. Generally one can find
precedents to support either side of a controversy. And
as one of America's greatest living jurists has recently
observed :7
"Many courts today are suspected of ascertaining
what the equities of a controversy require, and then rak-
ing up adjudicated cases to justify the result desired."
However, we must not become greatly alarmed over this
tendency, for, prior to the more mechanical stage of the
last generation, one of the greatest judges America has
ever produced admitted, after he had retired from the
bench, he did exactly what many present-day judges are
To Pound, The Theory of Judicial Decision. 36 HARv. L. REV. 940, 943 (1923).
I1 9 MODERN LEGAL PHILOSOPHY SERIES XXXVIII (1917).
72 See Orrin N. Carter, The Supreme Court and Its Method of Work, 1 ILL. L.
REV. 151 (1906).
78 POUND, o2. cit. aupra note 11, at 121.
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suspected of doing. As Kent put it:74 "I might once and
a while be embarrassed by a technical rule, but I most
always found principles suited to my views of the case."
A still further reason why the doctrine of stare decisis,
as generally interpreted and applied a generation ago, has
lost much of its usefulness for present and future purposes
is that not only is it often impractical today for any la~vyer
or judge to investigate all the numerous apt precedents,
but also, if the volume of precedents continues at its pres-
ent rate of growth, it will soon be quite impossible in many,
if not most, cases for any lawyer or judge to investigate
all apt precedents. Thus, it has been recently calculated
that. if precedents continue to increase as in the past, a
complete law library which today comprises about 18,500
volumes of precedents, not to mention statutes, would a
century hence contain 1,850,000 volumes of precedents. 7
It is quite impractical, therefore, to endeavor indefinitely
to administer law on the theory that, in order to determine
what the law is on a given point, it is necessary to investi-
gate all the multitudinous apt precedents and then follow
the "law" there found. A1 Mr. Justice Stone has recently
stated in this connection :76
"Can it be supposed that in the next century or fifty
years or twenty-five years from now, lawyers and judges
will be able by individual or indeed by any effective
cooperative effort to extract day by day from such a mass
of legal literature, the rules ana principles which shall
guide the conduct of clients and litigants; or if such a
laborious process were possible,, that the result of it
would be a system of law adequate to the needs of a
progressive and enlightened people? To hope that such
a mass of precedent can be penetrated even with the aid
of digests and glossators or that there could be extracted
from it any harmonious and workable legal doctrine is
to disregard the teachings and experience and to indulge,
Micawber-like, in the illusion that something, we know
not what, will turn up to remedy the growing difficulties
of our situation."
But let us concede that in general the social interest in
stability and the social interest in certainty and uniformity
7, In a letter quoted by Corbin, op. et. eupra note 28, at 244-245.
.9 See Stone, Some Aspects of the Problem of Law Simplification, 23 COL. L. REV.
319. 320 (1923).
7' lbid. at 320.
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in the law are, and will hereafter be, somewhat better
secured by the mechanical stare decisis of the last genera-
tion than by the present-day tendency. Yet there are
other important social interests which undoubtedly are far
more satisfactorily secured by assigning a less mechanical
and a more sociological function to precedents. And these
other interests frequently outweigh the social interests in
certainty and stability, and any other interests that would
be better secured by rigid adherence to precedent.
The first of these social interests which is, in effect
at least, better secured by this tendency to sacrifice prec-
dent to justice is the social interest in progress, e.g., the
social interest in legal progress. A generation ago an
eminent judge, reflecting the tendency of his time, said :77
"There has been a great searching for reasons for
these [legal] rules; but it does not signify what the reas-
ons for them are, if they are well recognised rules which
have existed from time immemorial."
As a result of such a judicial attitude the law of today, or
at any rate the law as laid down in the precedents, still
contains many ancient rules and doctrines that will not
stand the test of reason or practicality, and are out of har-
mony with modern conceptions of justice, e.g., the rule in
most jurisdictions that an undisclosed principal cannot be
sued on a sealed instrument. And, therefore, to follow
such precedents without considering "the reasons for them"
may, under present conditions, totally or largely prevent
progress. But society has an interest that there shall be
progress,-that the law of yesterday shall be improved so
as to mete out better social justice today and tomorrow,-
that in this age of practical rationalism 78 the impractical
irrational legal "rules" and interpretations and applications
of legal "rules" of a generation ago, if incapable of ade-
quately securing the various interests involved in the exis-
tence of modern civilized society, shall be changed into
practical rational legal rules and other premise-elements
and interpretations and applications thereof which, under
changed and changing conditions, will promote progress
and achieve the ends of justice.
7 Lord Esher, M. R., in Mexborough (Earl of) v. Whitwood etc. Council L. IL.
2 Q. B. 111, 115, (1897).
;. See 8upra note 85.
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For some time leading jurists have been emphasizing the
importance of having legal rules and other legal elements,
and interpretations and applications thereof, which will
work well in practice. 79 Eminent laymen have frequently
emphasized this need. Indeed there is voluminous evidence
that the opinion of civilized society today preponderates in
favor of more extensive legal progress. Witness the recent
formation of the American Law Institute for the improve-
ment of the law by a juristic restatement which would rid
the law of its numerous antiquated doctrines. 0 Witness
also the many recent suggestions by persons in high places
for the formation of ministries of justice to aid in effectu-
ating the improvement of the law.81 In a recent report of
an important national committee on the establishment of a
permanent organization for the improvement of the law, it
is stated that "the opinion of * * * [the law's] rules do not
work well in practice, and that its administration often re-
sults not in justice, but in injustice, is general among all
classes and among persons of widely divergent political and
social opinions."12 And ultimately, unless the preponder-
ant opinion in favor of such progress changes, the law will
in all probability secure such interest in progress, for, as
Mr. Justice Holmes has said, "every opinion tends to become
a law." 3 In the long run the law is, or tends to be, an
expression of the preponderant settled opinion or moral
sense of society, the mores of the times, as understood by
the courts and court-like tribunals. Therefore, since the
preponderant settled opinion or moral sense of society is in
favor of more extensive legal progress, many courts today
are consciously or subconsciously changing the rigid rule of
stare decisis into a more or less flexible doctrine, are judi-
cially renovating or restating the law so as to be able to
satisfy this social interest in particular and the social interest
in progress in general.
An interesting illustration of how the courts are tending
to secure the social interest in the progress of the law is the
recent Virginia Case of Harris v. McKay, 84 in which the
court, in departing from the rigid common-law rule, said:
11 See EHRLICH, 9 MODERN LEGAL PHILOSOPHY SERIES, 77-70 (1917).
1 See 1 AMERICAN LAW INSTrUTE, PROCEEDINOS, 18 (1928).
See. e.g., Cardozo, A Ministry of Justice, 85 HARv. L. REV. 118 (1921).
See 1 AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, PROCEEDINGS, 1 (1923).
"Lochner v. New York, supra note 18, at 76.
8, 138 Va. 448, 122 S. E. 127 (1924).
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"The tendency of the courts is to ignore in large meas-
ure the technical distinctions between sealed and unsealed
instruments which were so jealously guarded by the
common law [of past generations] * * * * * . The reason
for the rule that an undisclosed principal cannot be held
liable upon a contract under seal, executed by his agent
in his own name, no longer exists, and we know of no
sufficient reason why the protection of the rights [i.e.,
interests] of litigants requires that doctrine to be longer
maintained."
The salutary doctrine of the common law, emphasized by
Blackstone and others, cessante ratione cessat et ipsa lex,85
though nearly forgotten in the last generation, is being
revived and revised in the twentieth-century tendency to-
ward practical rationalism. This tendency places vast
power in the hands of the judges of the time being, a power
which, of course, may be, and sometimes is, wielded for
worse. But after all, as Ehrlich says,"" "there is no guar-
anty of justice except the personality of the judge." And
on the whole the good accomplished and accomplishable by
this recent tendency far outweighs, and in all probability
will hereafter far outweigh, the few attendant evils.
The significance of this movement away from the mechan-
ical jurisprudence of the last generation is admirably illus-
trated by the recent New York Case of Hynes v. New York
Central R. R. Co., 7 a case which falls within that compre-
hensive category of cases where the decision turns not so
much upon the question, what is the legal rule or other
premise-element applicable, as upon the proper interpreta-
tion or application of an admitted rule or other premise-
element. In that case a springboard, attached to a railway
company's land, projected over a river where the public had
a right to bathe. A, who was on the end of the springboard,
was injured through the negligence of the company. As
this springboard was a fixture, A was technically a tres-
passer, and, therefore, by a mechanical interpretation or
application of the law, the railway company did not owe him
a duty of due care. And the majority of the lower court,
and three of the seven judges of the appellate court, appar-
ently by a mechnical interpretation and application of pre-
65 2 BLACmSTONn, COMZBNTARIES 390, 391 (4th ed. 1770).
"' "reIe RechtAfndung und frele Rechtswissensehaft" (1908), tranal. 9 MODERN
LEQAL PHILOSOPHY SERIES 47, at 65 (1917).
81Su ,ra note 15.
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cedents, said the railway company was not liable. But the
majority of the Court of Alppeals, in an able opinion which
aptly expounds the sociological method, held otherwise.
Said the court (per Cardozo, J.,) :88
"This case is a striking instance of the dangers of 'a
jurisprudence of conceptions' (Pound, Mechanical Juris-
prudence, 8 Columbia L. Rev., 605, 608, 610), the exten-
sion of a maxim or a definition with relentless disregard
of consequences to 'a dryly logical extreme' * *. *. Here
* * * the fields [of immunity and privilege and of liability
and duty8 9] are brought together. In such circumstances,
there is little help in pursuing general maxims to ultimate
conclusions. They have been framed alio intuitu. They
must be reformulated and readapted to meet exceptional
conditions * * * . In one sense, that a highly technical
and artificial one,. the diver at the end of the springboard
is an intruder on the adjoining lands. In another sense,
and one that realists will accept more readily, he is still
on public waters in the exercise of public rights. The
law must say whether it will subject him to the rule of the
one field or of the other ** * * . We think that considera-
tions of analogy, of convenience, of policy, and of justice,
exclude him from the field of the defendant's immunity
and exemption and place him in the field of liability and
duty."
Under the dogmtizations of the last generation an appel-
late common-law court in dealing with such a case would,
in all probability, have espoused a mechanical jurisprudence
such was espoused by the lower court and apparently by
the three dissenting judges in the Court of Appeals. But
the majority of the appellate court wisely observed that
"rights and duties in systems of living law are not built
upon such quicksands." An administration of law that
will secure a maximum of interests with a minimum of
sacrifice of interests requires a practical, not a techni-
cal, interpretation and application of legal rules and
standards or other premise-elements. Therefore, the New
York court rightly buried the mechanical "dead hand of the
common-law" interpretation or application of the last gen-
eration and revived the hand of the living law of today, by
interpreting the law in a way "that realists 0 will accept
- At 23, 286.
89 Cf. Hohfeld, Some Fundamental Legal Conceptions as Applied in Judicial Reason.
ing, 23 YALS L. J. 16, 30 (1913).
91 As to realism in the modern movement see Frankfurter, op.. cit. oupra note 18.
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more readily", by practicalizing the applicable law or rather
the interpretation and application of the applicable law, so
as to make the law a more workable means to "satisfy at
all times as many demands as we can."'91
In this general direction, the Supreme Court of Appeals
Df West Virginia, in two recent practicalizing decisions, said:
"We think the practical administration of justice be-
tween the parties is more the duty of the court than the
preservation of some esoteric [legal] theory."92
"Courts must here cease to be pedantic and endeavor
to be practical."9 3
Thus, the modern movement in the law is, among other
things, a progress toward what we may call an "equitable"
rationalization and practicalization of the law and of the
interpretation and application of law. As the New York
Court of Appeals recently said in this general connection :94
"Those who think more of symmetry and logic in
the development of legal rules [and other premise-
elements] than of practical adaptation to the attainment
of a just result will be troubled by a classification where
the lines of division are so wavering and blurred. Some-
thing, doubtless, may be said on the score of consistency
and certainty in favor of a stricter standard. The courts
have balanced such considerations against those of equity
and fairness, and found the latter to be the weightier."
A different aspect of the social interest in progress which
is more adequately secured in the present generation and
which in one important respect has been secured only in
the present generation is the social interest in the
environmental betterment and beautification of the com-
munity. This interest includes much more than the social
interest in purely aesthetic surroundings which, though
legally unrecognized until recently, many courts of late are,
in effect at least, tending to recognize. The attitude of the
law in the last decade toward so-called zoning ordinances
and other regulations designed to give society a better gen-
01 See JAmES, THE WILL TO BELIVE, 205 (19161.
02 Jones v. Cook, 90 W. Va. 710, 717, ill S. E. 828 (1922).
03 West Va. Arichiteets & Builders v. Stewart, 68 W. Va. 606, 515, 70 S. E. 118
(1911), quoting with approval from WIoMOaE, EVIENcE, §1650 (1st ed. 1904).
0, Jacob and Youngs v. Kent, 280 N. Y. 289, 242-248, 129 N. E. 889 (1921). Italics
our.
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eral and aesthetic environment in which to live a fuller life
is too well known to justify further discussion. 5
Another social interest which is better secured by the
recent relaxing of stare decisis is the want or interest of
society that society shall be made to realize that it is getting
justice. As one of England's ablest judges once said:90
"Important as it was that people should get justice, it
was even more important that they should be made to
feel and see that they were getting it."
Therefore, a legal doctrine should not be too esoteric. What-
ever a lawyer may think about the justice of following a
precedent, where the precedent admittedly works a "grave
hardship" in the particular case, (and there are many law-
yers who think that it is not always just), it is reasonably
certain that society in general cannot see the justice of it.
And, as Elihu Root has aptly said :07
"The law is made not for lawyers but for their clients,
and it ought to be administered, so far as possible, along
the lines of the laymen's understanding and mental pro-
cesses."
Hence, the recent tendency to subordinate precedent to
prevailing conceptions and standards of social welfare
more adequately secures what we may call the social inter-
est in the satisfaction of the preponderant settled opinion
of society as to what is justice-another aspect of the more
extensive legal recognition of the accepted social standards
or the mores of the times.
Another social interest that is better secured by the
tendency to keep the law and the interpretation and appli-
cation of law up to date with the mores is the pressing
social interest in securing respect for and obedience to law.
There is no doubt that current disrespect for and disobe-
dience to much of the law is largely engendered by the
fact that much of the law and much of the interpretation
and application of law are seriously in conflict with the
prevailing views of justice, not the unsettled views of a
0 See Town of Windsor v. Whitney, 95 Comm. 867, 111 At]. 354 (1920), dis-
cussed in Comments, 30 YALE L. J. 171, 174 (1920): Lincoln Trust Co. v. Williams Bid.
Corp., 229 N. Y. 318, 128 N. E. 209 (1920). But see Fruth v. Board of Affairs, '5 W.
Va. 456, 84 S. E. 102 (1916). See Chandler, The Attitude of the Law Toward Beauty,
8 A. B. A. Joue. 470 (1922) ; Comments, 82 YALE L. J. 833 (1928) : Alfred Bettman,
Constitutionality of Zoning, 87 HARv. L. REv. 834 (1924).
9 Lord Herschell, quoted in 2 ATLAY, the ViCTOIAN CHANCELLORS 460.
07-The Layman's Criticism of the Lawyer, 39 AM. BAn AssN. REP. 88, 897.
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momentary majority (for, among other reasons, stability
would be unduly sacrificed if the laws should change with
such views), but the settled prevailing views of justice, the
accepted social standards, the mores of the times. Also,
there is no doubt that, if the law and the interpretation
and application of law are in harmony with such prevailing
views of justice, society will have more respect for law and
will be more inclined to obey the law. Hence, the recent
tendency to sacrifice precedents in order to keep the law
reasonably up to date with the mores more satisfactorily
secures the important social interest in promoting respect
for and obedience to law.
Of course, in some classes of cases, e.g., cases relating
to titles to real property where transactions have been
entered into, and titles have become vested, in reliance
upon judicial decisions, now admittedly erroneous, the
courts should seldom depart from precedent, for the simple
reason that in such cases adherence to admittedly erron-
eous precedent rather than departure from precedent will
almost always secure a maximum of interests with, a mini-
mum sacrifice of other interests.98 In these classes of cases an
erroneous old doctrine will almost invariably work better
in practice than will a new and theoretically better one.
Furthermore, the doctrine of stare decisis, when properly
interpreted and applied, is, in the great generality of cases,
a useful means for securing a maximum of interests in-
volved in controversies with a minimum sacrifice of other
interests. For, among other reasons, in the recent words
of an American judge:""
"It expedites the work of the courts by preventing
the constant reconsideration of [properly] settled ques-
tions; it [generally] enables lawyers to advise their
clients with a reasonable degree of certainty and safety;
it [generally] assures individuals that in so far as they
act on authoritative rules of conduct, their contract and
other rights will be protected in the courts; and, finally,
it makes for equality of treatment of all men before the
law."
Therefore, precedents should not be lightly disregarded
merely to prevent some hardship in the individual case.
C3 See Laclede Land & Improvement Co. v. Schneider, 177 S. W. 388, 390 (1915,
Sup. Ct. Mo.)
12 Moschzsker, op. cit. supra note 80, at 410.
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Even the continental doctrine of "libre recherche" or "freie
Rechtsfindung", so ably advocated by G~ny,100 Ehrlich 1°'
and others, does not sanction unscientific judicial freedom
of decision. Hence, those modernist judges who pay but
little attention to precedents,102 like the fundamentalist
judges who pay attention only to precedents, too often
sacrifice far more important interests than they secure.
Aflso those modernist judges who depart from precedents
because of their purely personal ideas as to what consti-
tutes social justice commonly commit a similar error. 0 3
But it does not follow that a precedent dealing with any
class of interests, if it is out of harmony with the commun-
ity's accepted ideas of social welfare or the mores of the
times, should be adhered to when, upon a balancing of all
the interests involved,-when upon considering whether
the proposed rule or other premise-element or the proposed
interpretation or application thereof will in practice work
better than the old one, it appears that, beyond a reasonable
doubt, a departure from precedent will in the long run
secure more interests and more important interests, will
secure a greater "general satisfaction"'1 4 by awakening a
less sum of dissatisfactions.
Summarily stated, the modern movement has among its
purposes what we may call an "equitable" rationalization
and practicalization of the law and of the interpretation
and application of law, by laying less stress on the techni-
cal, the dogmatic and the mechanical, and more stress on
the rational, the pragmatic and the merits of the case, by
laying more stress on the problem whether the law, and
interpretations and applications thereof, will work well in
practice, and, within the path-of-safety limits, by judi-
cially renovating or restating the law so as to accord with
prevailing practical ideas and the mores of the times, there-
by making legal rules and other premise-elements more
workable instruments for securing today and tomorrow the
various interests involved in civilized society, including the
interests more adequately secured by departure from
erroneous precedents. With these purposes, among others,
100 Op. cit. eupra note 60.
101 Op. cit. supra note 86.
102 See Judge Robinson's reply, 88 CENTRAL L. J. 155 (1919), and Notes, 83 HARY.
L, REv. 972 (1920).
- Cf. SToNE, LAW AND ITS AD INISTRATION, 46-47 (1915).
gnr See Corbin, op. cit supra note 28, at 248: "The aim of any legal system Isgeneral satisfaction."
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a sociological philosophy, either as a conscious or subcon-
scious force, is today, with an increasing number of judges
and jurists, tending to "give coherence and direction to
thought and action". 0 5 Under the influence of this philos-
ophy and its associated forces, there has developed a
tendency to sacrifice precedent to justice, with the result
that, the law is tending to be not only more and more
plastic and allied to life, but also more and more a rational
and a practical science rather than a theoretical one. And
under this modernization of law and of the interpretation
and application of law, the rigid rule of stare decisis of a
generation ago is, in many jurisdictions, changing into a
flexible workable doctrine, thus satisfying a great objective
of the modern jurists by becoming an efficient means "to
make effort more effective in achieving the purposes of
law." Only some such tendency-only some such philos-
Dphy-will "mediate between the conflicting claims of sta-
bility and progress, and supply a principle of growth."
1c Cf. CARDOZO, op. cit. supra note 9, at 12: "There is in each of us a stream of
tendency, whether you choose to call it philosophy or -not, which gives coherence and
direction to thought and action."
30
West Virginia Law Review, Vol. 32, Iss. 3 [1926], Art. 2
https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol32/iss3/2
